Abolitionists at home and abroad: A right to consular assistance and the death penalty by Mallory, Conall
Advance Copy 
 1 
ABOLITIONISTS AT HOME AND ABROAD: 
A RIGHT TO CONSULAR ASSISTANCE AND  
THE DEATH PENALTY 
Abolitionists at Home and Abroad 
CONALL MALLORY* 
The provision of consular assistance is critical to nationals who face criminal proceedings 
abroad which may result in the death penalty. In recent years the importance of a detained 
foreign national accessing consular authorities from their home state has been recognised as 
both a human right and an individual right in international law. Despite this, the question of 
whether there is an obligation on the national’s home state to provide consular assistance has 
yet to be answered. This article makes a case for the emergence of such a right to consular 
assistance in capital cases for nationals of states which have abolished the death penalty. With 
reference to both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the article locates this emerging right within a state’s positive 
obligation to protect life. It is recognised that for any such emerging right to be meaningful it 
must be capable of being enforced. The article therefore addresses the particular challenges of 
extraterritorially applying a right to consular assistance and proposes the return to a previous, 
more flexible, understanding of extraterritorial human rights obligations on consular agents. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
In countries where the death penalty remains, those victims die at the hands of 
that state but more importantly they are left to die by their own home states.1 
On 29 April 2015, with the eyes of the world watching, Indonesia executed 
eight individuals for drug trafficking offences. This episode generated global 
                                                 
 * Senior Lecturer in the School of Law, Northumbria University. An earlier version of this 
article was presented at the Canadian Law and Society Conference (Ottawa, 2015). My 
thanks to the participants in this session and to my colleagues at Northumbria for their 
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Journal of International Law for their assistance. Any remaining mistakes are my own. 
 1 Felicity Gerry, ‘Death or Freedom?’ on Criminal Law and Justice Weekly (3 April 2015) 
<https://perma.cc/JS6S-GYV2>. 
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media attention as, in many ways, it was a global event. Seven of those executed 
were foreign nationals from Australia, Brazil and Nigeria.2 In episodes like this, 
when a national of one state is facing execution in another, one of the main 
questions to arise is whether that national’s home state has done enough to assist 
them. This is most powerfully discussed in states that on principled, policy or 
moral grounds have abolished the death penalty as a form of criminal 
punishment. The attention generated in these episodes most regularly focuses on 
the latter parts of trial proceedings or after the national has already been 
sentenced to death. In recent years, however, focus has turned to the earlier 
stages of the matter and specifically to the point in time when the national’s 
home state can first offer help through the provision of consular assistance. 
The ability for a foreign defendant in a capital case to communicate with their 
home state’s consular authorities has now been recognised as an individual right 
in international law,3 and perhaps even a human right.4 Given this, it might 
appear natural for there to exist a concurrent right for a national to receive 
consular assistance from the authorities of their home state when facing the death 
penalty abroad, and yet this is not the case. This article sets out to establish a 
case for the emergence of a human right for individuals from states which have 
abolished the death penalty (‘abolitionist states’) to receive consular assistance 
when facing the possibility of execution abroad.5 It attempts to locate this right 
within the international legal framework, to address its content and form and to 
consider the wider problems which its application may encounter. 
The article is structured as follows. In Part II we briefly establish the 
substance and understanding of consular assistance in modern international law. 
In order to recognise the need for a right to consular assistance Part III employs 
academic literature and domestic and international jurisprudence to illustrate the 
critical contribution which consular agents can make in death penalty cases. Part 
IV then generates a case for an obligation on abolitionist states to provide 
consular assistance to nationals from within the international human rights 
framework. Part V concludes by identifying the central obstacle of enforceability 
that arises from the inherently extraterritorial application of any such right, and 
then addressing that problem.  
                                                 
 2 Paul Toohey, ‘Bali Nine Executions: How the Deaths of Andrew Chan and Myuran 
Sukumaran Happened’, news.com.au (online), 29 April 2015 <https://perma.cc/G8NX-
R2LT>; Joe Cochrane, ‘Indonesia Executes 8, Including 7 Foreigners, Convicted on Drug 
Charges’, The New York Times (online), 28 April 2015 <https://perma.cc/9R5R-3JJL>; 
Claire Phipps, ‘Who Were the Eight People Executed by Indonesia?’, The Guardian 
(online), 29 April 2015 <https://perma.cc/WWA9-R7NX>. 
 3 See, eg, LaGrand (Germany v United States of America) (Judgment) [2001] ICJ Rep 466 
(‘LaGrand’); Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States of America) 
(Judgment) [2004] ICJ Rep 12 (‘Avena’). 
 4 See Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the 
Due Process of Law (Advisory Opinion) [1999] Inter-Am Court HR (ser A) No 16. 
 5 An individual who is facing execution is one who has been accused of committing a crime 
which may result in the imposition of the death penalty. As a result, the right to consular 
assistance commences from the moment an individual is detained for questioning and 
continues until either their execution, or alternative resolution of their case. 
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II DEFINING CONSULAR ASSISTANCE 
Despite consular relations being practised between peoples since ‘ancient 
times’, there remains a degree of uncertainty as to its meaning, scope and legal 
foundation.6 This Part seeks to disentangle some of these issues in order to 
establish a platform for their discussion later in the article. At its most basic level 
consular assistance refers to the provision of support, help and guidance that the 
authorities of a state give to their nationals abroad.7 This assistance is described 
as the ‘consul’s most basic function’8 and is the first to appear in a  
non-exhaustive list in the principal treaty on consular law, the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations 1963 (‘VCCR’).9 Drafted at a time of great 
cataloguing of international legal rules, the VCCR is said to have ‘codified 
hundreds of years of consular practice’.10 It currently has 177 state parties and is 
widely considered as forming declaratory international law.11 
While consular agents hold some responsibility for the commercial and 
economic endeavours of their home state,12 assistance is most commonly 
understood to arise when an individual is in difficulty or distress abroad.13 There 
are specific provisions to deal with such circumstances, as art 5 of the VCCR 
provides for a series of actions which may be performed by a consular agent for 
                                                 
 6 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, opened for signature 24 April 1963, 596 UNTS 
261 (entered into force 19 March 1967) Preamble (‘VCCR’). Lee and Quigley have noted 
that ‘[u]ntil the adoption of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in 1963, consular 
relations were governed by a small number of customary rules of international law’:  
Luke T Lee and John B Quigley, Consular Law and Practice (Oxford University Press,  
3rd ed, 2008) 16. For an account of the historical foundations of consular relations, see  
D C M Platt, The Cinderella Service: British Consuls since 1825 (Longman, 1971); Jaroslav 
Zourek, Special Rapporteur, Consular Intercourse and Immunities, UN Doc A/CN.4/108 
(15 April 1957), in [1957] II Yearbook of the International Law Commission 71 (‘Report on 
Consular Intercourse and Immunities’). 
 7 Margaret Mendenhall, ‘A Case for Consular Notification: Treaty Obligation as a Matter of 
Life or Death’ (2001) 8 Southwestern Journal of Law & Trade in the Americas 335, 342. 
 8 Lee and Quigley, above n 6, 116.  
 9 VCCR art 5(a). 
 10 Cindy Galway Buys, ‘Reflections on the 50th Anniversary of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations’ (2013) 38 Southern Illinois University Law Journal 57, 57. The 
codification of consular intercourse and immunities was one of 14 initial topics 
provisionally considered for codification by the International Law Commission in 1949: 
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its First Session, UNGAOR,  
4th sess, Supp No 10, UN Docs A/CN.4/13 and Corr. 1–3 (12 April 1949) [16]. 
 11 Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, ‘The Humanization of Consular Law: The Impact of 
Advisory Opinion No. 16 (1999) of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights on 
International Case-Law and Practice’ (2007) 6 Chinese Journal of International Law 1, 3. 
 12 VCCR arts 5(b)–(c), (k)–(l).  
 13 The United Kingdom defines its consular service as ‘the part of the UK Government to 
which British nationals turn when they encounter serious problems overseas, from lost 
passports to kidnapping, arrest or the death of a loved one. It acts as an emergency service in 
the event of a crisis abroad and will arrange evacuation for British nationals. It also provides 
comprehensive travel advice and warnings, as well as more routine documentary and 
registration services for expatriates. With a broad range of services focused on nationals 
abroad, it is the main way in which the British public comes into contact with the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (FCO), and it provides unique and vital services to British 
nationals overseas’: Foreign Affairs Committee, Support for British Nationals Abroad: The 
Consular Service, House of Commons Paper No HC 516, Session 2014–15 (2014) 14 [5] 
(‘Support for British Nationals Abroad: The Consular Service’). See also Lord Goldsmith, 
‘Citizenship: Our Common Bond’ (Report of the Citizenship Review, United Kingdom 
Ministry of Justice, 2008) 34 [38].  
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the purpose of ‘helping and assisting nationals’.14 For example, one such 
function concerns safeguarding the interests of minors and those lacking full 
capacity,15 while others refer to assistance in the transmission of documents16 
and with legal representation.17 In addition, art 5(m) contains a ‘catch-all’ 
provision allowing for ‘any other functions entrusted to a consular post by the 
sending State which are not prohibited by the laws and regulations of the 
receiving State’.18 Alongside the list found in art 5 of the VCCR, consular 
functions may also be prescribed through the issuance of consular instructions, in 
custom, bilateral treaty and national law.19 Therefore, as G R Berridge aptly 
notes, the work of consular officials is ‘famously rich in variety’.20 The breadth 
of these functions enables consular agents to take a range of actions in order to 
support a national facing the death penalty abroad. 
A particularly important distinction to be made is between consular assistance 
and diplomatic protection. Although the purposes of both practices are to assist a 
national abroad, a series of critical differences exist between them. First, 
diplomatic protection is only engaged once an ‘internationally wrongful act’ has 
caused injury to a national, while consular assistance is not time-restricted and 
normally commences as soon as a national is in distress and reaches out for 
help.21 Annemarieke Künzli appropriately summarises this difference, noting 
that consular assistance plays a preventive role, assisting nationals when they are 
in danger or distress, while diplomatic protection takes on a more remedial 
nature.22 Secondly, consular assistance tends to be provided to a national directly 
by representatives of their home state and with the consent of the forum state, 
whereas diplomatic protection involves representations of a more political 
nature, at intergovernmental level.23 Thus the relationship between state and 
individual is very different, with consular assistance being traditionally more 
intimate in nature. As a consequence, the third distinction is that, generally 
speaking, a diplomatic agent is a political representative while a consular agent 
                                                 
 14 VCCR art 5(e).  
 15 Ibid art 5(h). 
 16 Ibid art 5(j). 
 17 Ibid art 5(i). 
 18 Ibid art 5(m). 
 19 Lee and Quigley, above n 6, 107.  
 20 G R Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (Palgrave Macmillan, 4th ed, 2010) 130. 
 21 Diplomatic protection was defined in the 2006 International Law Commission draft articles 
on the subject as follows: ‘diplomatic protection consists of the invocation by a State, 
through diplomatic action or other means of peaceful settlement, of the responsibility of 
another State for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act of that State to a 
natural or legal person that is a national of the former State with a view to the 
implementation of such responsibility’. International Law Commission, Diplomatic 
Protection: Titles and Texts of the Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection Adopted by the 
Drafting Committee on Second Reading, UN GAOR, 58th sess, UN Doc A/CN.4/L.684  
(19 May 2006) art 1. 
 22 Annemarieke Künzli, ‘Exercising Diplomatic Protection: The Fine Line between Litigation, 
Demarches and Consular Assistance’ (2006) 66 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches 
Recht und Völkerrecht 321, 331–2. 
 23 See Berridge, above n 20, 128–9.  
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has no such function.24 The result is that consular and diplomatic agents can 
have widely different roles.25 
In the context of death penalty cases this distinction can have major practical 
implications on interstate relationships. Diplomatic protections are usually only 
invoked late in the episode once an individual has been sentenced to death. These 
representations can lead to tensions between the respective governments, 
particularly if there is heightened media attention or if there are questions about 
the fairness of the trial where the death sentence was passed.26 As will be 
illustrated, effective consular assistance at an early stage can avoid these 
contentious diplomatic disputes by helping the national avoid the imposition of 
the death penalty in the first place. 
The reason for articulating the distinction here is because there is a tendency 
for both topics to be addressed together.27 It is a distinction that Künzli has noted 
as causing confusion amongst both government officials and legal scholars 
alike.28 There is some explanation for an overlap between the two in that, as Jan 
Melissen notes, ‘the traditional contradistinction between separate consular and 
diplomatic worlds is in fact well beyond its “sell-by” date’.29 Moreover, the 
VCCR allows for a certain degree of overlap between diplomatic and consular 
functions. Article 2(2) notes that the establishment of diplomatic relations will 
also imply the establishment of consular relations,30 art 3 allows diplomatic 
missions to exercise consular functions in certain circumstances31 and art 17 
allows consular agents to exercise diplomatic functions.32 Nonetheless, when a 
diplomatic agent provides consular assistance they do just that and no more. 
Perhaps the greatest distinction in consular affairs concerns variances in the 
legal position of consular assistance between states. The main distinction here is 
between states which have legally enshrined consular assistance as a right and 
those who provide it only as a matter of policy given to nationals as a privilege 
or grace, and solely at the discretion of the state.33 For the former group, 
Christopher Tran describes consular assistance as usually being given ‘as of 
                                                 
 24 Künzli, above n 22, 321.  
 25 These differences are manifested in ‘their appointment, the form of their credentials, their 
assumption of office and their attributes’: Report on Consular Intercourse and Immunities, 
UN Doc A/CN.4/108, 79 [68]. 
 26 After the execution of their nationals in Indonesia in January 2015, both Brazil and the 
Netherlands withdrew their ambassadors from Jakarta: ‘Brazil and Netherlands Recall 
Indonesia Ambassadors over Drug Executions’, The Guardian (online), 18 January 2015 
<https://perma.cc/FLX4-HJAR>. 
 27 Writing on the obligation for abolitionist states to refrain from assisting in the use of the 
death penalty, Malkani positions consular assistance within the wider heading of diplomatic 
protection: Bharat Malkani, ‘The Obligation to Refrain from Assisting the Use of the Death 
Penalty’ (2013) 62 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 523, 539–41. 
 28 Künzli, above n 22, 331. 
 29 Jan Melissen, ‘The Consular Dimension of Diplomacy’ in Jan Melissen and Ana Mar 
Fernández (eds), Consular Affairs and Diplomacy (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011) 1, 2. 
 30 VCCR art 2(2). 
 31 Ibid arts 3, 70.  
 32 Ibid art 17.  
 33 ‘Grace’ is used by Lee and Quigley, above n 6, 117. See also Christina M Cerna, ‘The Right 
to Consular Notification as a Human Right’ (2008) 31 Suffolk Transnational Law Review 
419, 419–21. 
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right’, and ‘almost always provided as of course’.34 Luke Lee and John Quigley 
rely on a weight of cross-jurisdictional research to illustrate how, particularly 
when a national is arrested abroad, an obligation towards them is recognised by 
their home state.35 Elsewhere, Quigley charts examples of how consular 
assistance is legally recognised in different jurisdictions, including through 
legislation, as a constitutional right and as an administrative regulation.36 From 
this, he contends that the provision of consular assistance is increasingly 
regarded as an obligation.37 
Maaike Okano-Heijmans takes the opposite view, noting that although states 
have a responsibility to their nationals abroad ‘most countries do not grant 
citizens the legal right to consular assistance’.38 Examples of states which take 
this position include the United Kingdom and Canada where, instead of being 
enshrined as a legal right, consular assistance is treated as a matter of policy and 
is provided through the exercise of the royal prerogative.39 Although not 
provided as of right in these states, decisions relating to consular assistance can 
be challenged under judicial review proceedings, most regularly through 
recourse to the doctrine of legitimate expectations.40 
Given that some states provide consular assistance as a legal right, while 
others still recognise its enforceability through principles of judicial review, 
there may be cause to question whether a wider right to consular assistance in 
death penalty cases would be useful. The merits in recognising such a right 
would be threefold. First, it would ensure uniform commitment between all 
abolitionist states and not simply those who have already enshrined such 
assistance as a legal right. For many states the recognition of such an obligation 
would make little practical difference to how they already act when informed 
that a national is facing criminal charges abroad that may result in the death 
penalty. For those who are unreasonably slow to respond, or who do not provide 
consular assistance at all, the obligation would act to ensure their compliance. 
Secondly, once an obligation is established, focus could then turn to perhaps the 
more interesting question of what is included in such a right. Is it mere advice 
and assistance, or should the state take further actions as necessary, such as 
locating an appropriate legal representative or interpreter and submitting an 
amicus curiae brief? Thirdly, and linked to the former benefit, in establishing the 
obligation on states, a development would then take place whereby states would 
                                                 
 34 Christopher Tran, ‘Revisiting Allegiance and Diplomatic Protection’ [2012] Public Law 
197, 202. 
 35 Lee and Quigley, above n 6, 134. 
 36 John B Quigley, ‘Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: In Retrospect and into the 
Future’ (2013) 38 Southern Illinois University Law Journal 1, 17–18. 
 37 Ibid 17. 
 38 Maaike Okano-Heijmans, ‘Changes in Consular Assistance and the Emergence of Consular 
Diplomacy’ in Jan Melissen and Ana Mar Fernández (eds), Consular Affairs and Diplomacy 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2011) 21, 26 (emphasis in original). 
 39 The UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office guide to nationals abroad clearly states this: 
‘Generally, there is no legal right to consular assistance. All assistance provided is at our 
discretion’. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Support for British Nationals Abroad:  
A Guide (United Kingdom, 2014) 4 (‘Support for British Nationals Abroad: A Guide’). 
 40 See, eg, Khadr v Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs) [2004] FC 1145 (18 August 2004);  
R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs; ex parte Butt (1999) 116 ILR 
607 (EWHC Admin). 
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be held to account for breaching the obligation and would have a responsibility 
to report on the nature of assistance which they currently provide so as to fulfil 
the obligation. This in turn would give rise to an understanding of best practices 
which could be followed by abolitionist and retentionist states alike. 
As this Part has illustrated, there are variations in the meaning, scope and 
legal foundation of consular assistance. This is hardly surprising. The topic has 
received much less analysis than its counterpart of diplomatic protection. Current 
academic literature on consular affairs is described by Melissen as being ‘rather 
thinly scattered’,41 with the area itself being a ‘much-neglected study’.42 Despite 
this, one area of consular assistance which has received intensive scrutiny in 
recent years is that which concerns a national’s access to a consular official when 
they are detained. It is to this access, and the critical contribution consular 
assistance makes to nationals in this situation, which we now turn. 
III THE CRITICAL ROLE OF CONSULAR ASSISTANCE IN DEATH PENALTY CASES 
The departure point for this analysis is recognition of the inherent challenges 
that foreign nationals encounter in establishing a coherent defence against 
criminal prosecutions in an alien jurisdiction. Not only do these individuals face 
difficulty understanding unfamiliar legal principles, but often do so while 
concurrently facing cultural, linguistic and emotional obstacles. S Adele Shank 
and John Quigley have highlighted that, when combined, this places foreign 
nationals at a natural disadvantage when accused of a capital offence.43 Fair 
Trials International has echoed this in a submission to the UK Foreign Affairs 
Committee, noting that these challenges make foreign nationals on death row 
particularly ‘vulnerable’.44 Christof Heyns, United Nations Special Rapporteur 
on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions (‘UNSRESAE’) concurs, 
observing that available statistics illustrate that foreign nationals ‘remain 
disproportionately affected by the death penalty in several States’.45 
The importance of consular assistance to foreign nationals in this situation has 
been recognised by a host of commentators. Mark Kadish and Charles Olson 
have listed some of the positive influences which effective consular assistance 
can have for nationals detained abroad. These include mitigating ‘the harm 
caused by language and cultural barriers’; forming a ‘cultural bridge’; explaining 
‘substantive and procedural rights’; and providing both translators and ‘contact 
information for lawyers’.46 Malcolm Shaw adds that consular agents also 
conduct their functions through ‘visiting prisons and contacting local 
                                                 
 41 Melissen, above n 29, 1. 
 42 Ibid. 
 43 S Adele Shank and John Quigley, ‘Foreigners on Texas’s Death Row and the Right of 
Access to a Consul’ (1995) 26 St Mary’s Law Journal 719, 720. 
 44 Fair Trials International, Submission No CON0015 to the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom, Written Evidence from Fair Trials International, 13 May 2014, [1]. 
 45 Christof Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions, GA Res 67/168, UN GAOR, 70th sess, Agenda Item 73(b), UN Doc A/70/304  
(7 August 2015) [76] (‘Report of the Special Rapporteur’).  
 46 Mark J Kadish and Charles C Olson, ‘Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon and Article 36 of the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: The Supreme Court, the Right to Consul, and 
Remediation’ (2006) 27 Michigan Journal of International Law 1185, 1188. 
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authorities’.47 Shank and Quigley develop this by noting that, in their visits, 
agents can determine if the national has faced physical abuse and whether they 
are being detained in adequate conditions.48 They also suggest that the mere 
involvement of consular agents may encourage local authorities to follow proper 
procedures.49 Margaret Mendenhall contributes an often unseen provision of 
‘comfort and communication’ to the national while they are in strange 
surroundings.50 Combined, these actions go some way to mitigating against the 
inherent challenges foreign nationals face in criminal prosecutions. 
The importance of consular assistance for a detained foreign national when 
facing criminal charges is recognised in art 36 of the VCCR, sub-s (1) of which 
states: 
Article 36 
Communication and contact with nationals of the sending State 
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to 
nationals of the sending State: 
 
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the 
sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending 
State shall have the same freedom with respect to communication 
with and access to consular officers of the sending State; 
 
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State 
shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, 
within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or 
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any 
other manner … 
 
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending 
State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and 
correspond with him and to arrange for his legal representation. They 
shall also have the right to visit any national of the sending State who 
is in prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a 
judgement … 
This provision has been thoroughly juridified, largely in relation to the poor 
compliance record of the United States with observing this right to consular 
access.51 An indirect benefit of this litigation is that it has allowed for an insight 
into the critical need for the provision of consular assistance to foreign nationals 
facing capital charges. The US case of Breard provides an example of the 
dangers a foreign national faces when they are not afforded consular 
                                                 
 47 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (Cambridge University Press, 5th ed, 2003) 688. 
 48 Shank and Quigley, above n 43, 736. 
 49 Ibid 721. 
 50 Mendenhall, above n 7, 347.  
 51 Cançado Trindade, above n 11, 15. It has been noted that in the decade until 2010 almost 
400 cases had been lodged in US Federal Courts by individuals claiming that their right to 
consular access had been violated. See Cindy Galway Buys, Scott D Pollock and Ioana 
Navarette Pellicer, ‘Do unto Others: The Importance of Better Compliance with Consular 
Notification Rights’ (2011) 21 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law 461, 
461. 
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assistance.52 Angel Breard was a Paraguayan national who was sentenced to 
death in Virginia in 1992 for attempted rape and murder.53 On his arrest Breard 
was not notified of his right to seek consular assistance. It would not be until 
after his trial and conviction that Paraguayan authorities even became aware of 
his detention. Without such assistance to provide guidance on the nuances of the 
American legal system, Breard made a series of ill-considered decisions that 
greatly increased the likelihood that he would face execution. Most notable of 
these was his decision to refuse a plea bargain which would have seen him 
receive a life sentence. On the mistaken belief that the jury would be sympathetic 
to his honesty and his new commitment to a religious faith, Breard pleaded not 
guilty and proceeded to trial where he waived his right to not incriminate 
himself, confessed to the facts of the crime and explained to the jury that he had 
only committed the offences as his father-in-law had placed him under a satanic 
curse.54 Unreceptive to this mistaken strategy, the jury found him guilty and he 
was sentenced to death. 
On finally learning of Breard’s detention, Paraguayan officials petitioned both 
domestic and international courts for recognition of the breach of art 36. The 
impact of the lack of consular assistance was concisely highlighted in Paraguay’s 
submission to the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’): 
Mr Breard’s refusal of the plea offer against the advice of court-appointed counsel 
and his insistence on serving as a witness to his religious faith resulted from his 
lack of understanding of the significant cultural differences between the 
Paraguayan and United States legal systems. He was, in particular, entirely 
unfamiliar with the practice of plea bargaining. Mr Breard neither understood nor 
trusted his court-appointed trial counsel. Similarly, trial counsel could not 
understand or appreciate Mr Breard’s belief that leniency would result from his 
confession to the jury.55 
In Breard the acute damage caused by a lack of consular assistance was 
inflicted at the pre-trial stage when he rejected the plea bargain which would 
have ultimately spared his life. This illustrates the importance of consular 
assistance at the earliest stages of criminal proceedings, a point which has been 
noted by the British government who have identified that ‘this is when the issue 
of life or death is most readily resolved’.56 For instance, if a consular official is 
able to engage with the national at the earliest stages of the investigation they can 
explain to them any procedural rights in the forum state, such as the right to 
                                                 
 52 ‘Memorial of Paraguay’, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v United 
States of America) [1998] ICJ Pleadings 89. For an insightful discussion of this case, see 
Philippe Sands, Lawless World: America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules 
(Allen Lane, 2005) xii–xvi. 
 53 Breard also carried nationality of Argentina, however it was the Paraguayan authorities who 
provided diplomatic representations on his behalf in this case. 
 54 ‘Memorial of Paraguay’, Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v United 
States of America) [1998] ICJ Pleadings 89, 98 [2.8]. 
 55 Ibid 99 [2.11]. 
 56 Clive Stafford Smith, Assisting European Citizens Facing Execution outside the  
European Union (Briefing Paper No EXPO/B/DROI/2010/08, European Parliament, 
Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, Policy Department, 2010) 10. 
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silence, use of mitigating factors in sentencing, and indeed the nature of plea 
bargaining.57 
Breard was executed before the ICJ could fully deliberate on the extent of  
art 36 and the breach of his ‘right to consular access’.58 Despite this, a strikingly 
similar case soon followed, again from the United States.59 That case, the 
landmark judgment of LaGrand, concerned the execution of two German 
brothers who had been found guilty of murder, armed robbery and kidnapping in 
Arizona.60 Germany brought the case against the United States to the ICJ on the 
basis that, again, the defendants were not made aware of their right to consular 
assistance at any stage before or during trial.61 The ICJ ruled in favour of 
Germany, importantly noting that the benefit conferred in art 36 was not only a 
state’s right, but that it had created individual rights which had been breached.62 
In pleading the case Germany had gone even further to suggest that art 36 not 
only conferred a right on individuals, but that the right was a specific human 
right.63 The Court deftly sidestepped this issue by instead noting that it had 
already found a violation of an individual right and so did not need to consider 
the recognition of a human right to consular access. Christian Tams has 
applauded the Court for this approach in ‘prudently avoiding a politicization of 
the dispute’.64 Nonetheless, he highlights the decision as an affirmation that 
‘under modern international law, individual rights need not necessarily derive 
from classical human rights treaties, but are a pervasive phenomenon’.65 
The question of a human right to consular access was revisited a short time 
later in the Avena case. On this occasion Mexico asserted at the ICJ that the 
United States had breached the fundamental human rights of 51 Mexican 
                                                 
 57 Malkani, above n 27, 536. 
 58 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v United States of America) 
(Provisional Measures) [1998] ICJ Rep 248, 256 [29] (‘Paraguay v United States’). The ICJ 
had issued provisional measures requesting that no further action was taken against Mr 
Breard until after the merits hearing: Paraguay v United States [1998] ICJ Rep 248, 258 
[41]. The US Supreme Court had concurrently considered the case and refused Mr Breard’s 
appeal: Breard v Greene, 523 US 371, 371 (1998). He was subsequently executed. The case 
was ultimately resolved with the US issuing an apology to the Paraguayan government and 
people for the failure to notify consular authorities, and the Paraguayan government 
withdrew its complaint from the ICJ: Mark Warren, Foreign Nationals News and 
Developments — Previous Years (8 March 2005) Death Penalty Information Centre 
<https://perma.cc/29PD-E5YW>. 
 59 At the time the United States was emerging as a ‘notorious violator’ of this Article.  
Marshall J Ray, ‘The Right to Consul and the Right to Counsel: A Critical Re-Examining of 
State v Martinez-Rodriguez’ (2007) 37 New Mexico Law Review 701, 703. Cançado 
Trindade has also referred to the United States as a ‘a persistent violator of the relevant 
provisions of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations’: Cançado Trindade, 
above n 11, 15. Buys notes however that ‘[t]he United States is by no means alone in 
struggling with implementation of the consular notification requirements of the VCCR’: 
Buys, above n 10, 71. 
 60 LaGrand [2001] ICJ Rep 466, 475 [14]. 
 61 Ibid 494 [77]. 
 62 Ibid. 
 63 Ibid 494 [78]. 
 64 Christian J Tams, ‘Consular Assistance: Rights, Remedies and Responsibility: Comments 
on the ICJ’s Judgment in the LaGrand Case’ (2002) 13 European Journal of International 
Law 1257, 1257. 
 65 Ibid.  
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nationals on death row by failing to protect their right to consular access.66 
Again the Court recognised an individual right but refused to pass definitive 
judgment on the possibility of a human right to consular access: 
Whether or not the Vienna Convention rights are human rights is not a matter that 
this Court need decide. The Court would, however, observe that neither the text 
nor the object and purpose of the Convention, nor any indication in the travaux 
préparatoires, support the conclusion that Mexico draws from its contention in 
that regard.67 
Despite this finding, a human right to consular access has been recognised 
elsewhere. In 1985, a UN General Assembly Resolution recognised an alien’s 
right to communicate with their consulate.68 This was done in the Declaration on 
the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the Country in Which 
They Live.69 More recently, alongside making representations to the ICJ, Mexico 
sought an advisory opinion from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(‘IACtHR’) on the status of consular access. Here, the Court unanimously held 
that the right to consular access ‘concerns the protection of the rights of a 
national of the sending State and is part of the body of international human rights 
law’.70 Specifically the IACtHR held that the right for a detained national to 
receive information on consular assistance informed the wider right to a fair trial 
under art 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(‘ICCPR’) and that where this was in breach in a case concerning the death 
penalty there could also be a breach of the right to life under art 6(2).71 Thus the 
Court not only recognised the right as forming part of the wider body of 
international human rights law, but recognised that in breaching art 36 a state 
could concurrently breach the specific right to life and to a fair trial.72 This is 
useful for the purposes of formulating a right to receive consular assistance from 
a home state in that, as with a right to consular access, it establishes that such a 
right may be located in pre-existing human rights protections. 
 
 
                                                 
 66 Avena [2004] ICJ Rep 12, 33 [35]. 
 67 Ibid 52 [124]. 
 68 Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not Nationals of the Country in 
Which They Live, GA RES 40/144, UN GAOR, 116th plen mtg, UN Doc A/RES/40/144 (13 
December 1985) art 10. 
 69 Ibid. It has also been recognised at the General Assembly on two further occasions:  
see Protection of Migrants, GA Res 54/166, UN GAOR, 54th sess, Agenda Item 116(b),  
UN Doc A/RES/54/166 (24 February 2000) para 4; Protection of Migrants, GA Res 55/92, 
UN GAOR, 55th sess, Agenda Item 114(b), UN Doc A/RES/55/92 (26 February 2001)  
para 5. 
 70 Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees of the 
Due Process of Law (Advisory Opinion) [1999] Inter-Am Court HR (ser A) No 16, [141] 
(emphasis in original).  
 71 Ibid.  
 72 This has been reiterated by the UN Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary or Arbitrary Executions: ‘The denial of the right to consular notification and 
access is a violation of due process and the execution of a foreign national deprived of such 
rights constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of life, in contravention of articles 6 and 14 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’. Report of the Special Rapporteur,  
UN Doc A/70/304, 19 [93]. 
12 Melbourne Journal of International Law [Vol 17 
Advance Copy 
A regular counterargument to the assertion that consular access is a human 
right is the fact that, as noted in Part II, some states still provide consular  
assistance on a discretionary basis. Christina Cerna has articulated this argument: 
If consular assistance is a ‘human’ right and not merely a ‘treaty’ right, one would 
expect that the obligation of the alien’s state to actually provide the alien with 
assistance should be more than purely discretionary with the State.73 
This argument is predicated on the current lack of recognition for a human 
right to consular assistance in death penalty cases which this article is seeking to 
remedy. Admittedly however, any such human right will need to be derived from 
existing treaty-based rights.  
Before moving on to this discussion of a human right to consular assistance, it 
is worthwhile noting that the question of whether a national has an individual 
right in international law to receive consular assistance from his/her home state 
has not yet been directly considered by a court. The issue was touched upon, but 
not resolved, in the Canadian case of Khadr. Omar Khadr had been captured by 
US forces in Afghanistan and detained at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In this case, a 
strike-out application and the first of a number involving Khadr, the applicant’s 
family sought for the provision of both diplomatic protection and consular 
assistance by Canadian officials for him while he was detained.74 They did so by 
referring to the state’s obligations under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, the doctrine of legitimate expectations and customary international 
law. In addressing the application, Justice von Finckenstein found a possible 
cause of action in both the doctrine of legitimate expectations and at international 
law.75 The basis for the international law argument was that, following LaGrand, 
an international custom may exist for nationals to receive certain forms of 
consular assistance from their home state.76 This aspect of the litigation did not 
continue to a full hearing and so the opportunity for a domestic court’s 
recognition of a customary international law obligation to consular assistance 
was lost.77 It could be argued that recognition of such a right in customary 
international law may be difficult to substantiate, particularly given that some 
states still provide consular assistance as a privilege.78 Such an approach would 
probably not meet the opinio juris required for a custom, or at least position 
certain states as objectors. 
                                                 
 73 Cerna, above n 33, 421. 
 74 See, eg, Khadr v Canada (Minister of Justice) [2005] FC 1076 (8 August 2005);  
Khadr v Canada (Minister of Justice) [2006] FC 509 (25 April 2006); Khadr v Canada 
(Minister of Justice) [2007] FC 182 (10 May 2007); Canada (Minister of Justice) v Khadr 
[2008] 2 SCR 125; John Currie, ‘Khadr’s Twist on Hape: Tortured Determinations of the 
Extraterritorial Reach of the Canadian Charter’ (2008) 46 Canadian Yearbook of 
International Law 307. 
 75 Khadr v Canada (Minister of Foreign Affairs) [2004] FC 1145 (18 August 2004) [22]  
(von Finckenstein J). 
 76 Justice von Finckenstein noted: ‘Specifically, the International Court of Justice’s decision in 
LaGrand states that the VCCR does create individual rights to the services requested by the 
Applicants in this case. The Applicants should also have the opportunity to present evidence 
that an international custom has also evolved with regards to the provision of certain 
consular services’. Ibid [27] (citations omitted). 
 77 Khadr v Canada (Prime Minister) [2009] FC 405 (23 April 2009) [24] (O’Reilly J). 
 78 The United Kingdom perhaps being the main example. See Part II above for further 
discussion of this. 
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Whether an individual right to consular assistance exists in international treaty 
law is also doubtful. Reflecting on the VCCR, from which the individual right to 
consular access has been derived, there is little evidence to suggest that the treaty 
was intended to confer an individual right onto nationals to receive consular 
assistance from their home state. Although it was clearly drafted in order to 
facilitate the performance of consular functions, it was very much done so at an 
interstate level and without direct consideration of the individual. The only 
individual rights which can be derived from the treaty are those which are 
granted to consular agents and their associates in order to facilitate performance 
of their roles,79 and those found in art 36 pertaining to consular access.80 During 
the drafting of the treaty it was specifically noted how art 36 was different from 
other provisions in this vein. It was said to have ‘introduced a novelty to the 
convention by defining the rights of the nationals of the sending States and not, 
as stated in paragraph 1 of the commentary, the rights of consular officials’.81 
This suggests that no other clause or enumeration within the treaty was reserved 
for the individual rights of the sending state’s nationals. 
Having established the critical need for consular assistance in death penalty 
cases, and with no apparent recourse in international consular law for an 
individual right to receive such assistance from a home state, it is ultimately 
necessary to search for the source of such a right in international human rights 
law. 
IV LOCATING THE EMERGING HUMAN RIGHT TO CONSULAR ASSISTANCE FOR 
THOSE FACING THE DEATH PENALTY 
The need for consular support in death penalty cases has also been recognised 
by the UNSRESAE. In his August 2015 report, Christof Heyns recognised a 
responsibility on abolitionist states to provide such assistance. He stated: 
If it can empirically be shown that the provision of consular assistance can 
materially diminish the likelihood of the imposition of a death sentence (and the 
statistics made available by Governments with specialist programmes suggests 
that this is the case), then a Government that, when notified, does not take all 
reasonable steps to provide adequate consular assistance can arguably be said to 
have failed in its duty of due diligence to protect its nationals from arbitrary 
deprivations of life.82 
This Part aims to provide the legal foundation in international human rights 
treaty law for this emerging right to consular assistance for nationals facing the 
                                                 
 79 Generally VCCR arts 28–53 contain provisions protecting either the office or the individual 
consul.  
 80 VCCR art 36. 
 81 United Nations Conference on Consular Relations: Consideration of the Draft Articles on 
Consular Relations Adopted by the International Law Commission at Its Thirteenth Session, 
15th mtg, UN Doc A/CONF.25/6 (14 March 1963) [37] (Sayed Mohammed Hosni 
(Kuwait)). 
 82 Report of the Special Rapporteur, UN Doc A/70/304, [109]. See also Christof Heyns, 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,  
GA Res 65/2008, UNGAOR, 67th sess, Agenda Item 70(b), UN Doc A/67/275 (9 August 
2012) [68]–[97]. Heyns further notes that ‘[s]tates that have abolished the death penalty 
should take all reasonable steps to ensure that their citizens do not face the imposition of the 
death penalty overseas’: Report of the Special Rapporteur, UN Doc A/70/304, [119].  
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prospect of the death penalty abroad. Once established, Part V will consider the 
inherent difficulties in enforcing any such obligation. 
A useful starting point in locating this obligation is a remark on the distinction 
the article makes between abolitionist and retentionist states. The argument being 
made is that there is an emerging right to consular assistance in death penalty 
cases for nationals of abolitionist states. This is not to say that retentionist states 
may not also have an obligation to provide consular assistance to their nationals 
abroad, with such an obligation being derived from existing commitments in 
international treaty law. Indeed, it is perhaps surprising to note that some 
retentionist governments provide an exceptional level of assistance to nationals 
facing execution abroad.83 Instead the distinction made in this article is due to 
the incipient nature of any right to consular assistance. If such an emerging right 
exists then there is little doubt that its development is more advanced amongst 
abolitionist states than their retentionist counterparts. More importantly, as will 
be illustrated in this Part, the legal foundation for such a right to consular 
assistance is located within states’ commitments to provisions of international 
treaty law. Some of these commitments refer specifically to treaties which 
prohibit the death penalty. With the corresponding obligation arising from these 
legal commitments, which retentionist states are unlikely to have made, the 
argument that such states owe an obligation to provide consular assistance is 
much weaker. 
Two further comments should be made on this distinction. First, for the same 
reason as that provided in relation to retentionist states, the case for the existence 
of an emerging right to consular assistance is stronger for nationals of states 
which have abolished the death penalty de facto and de jure, than those who have 
only abolished it in practice but not law.84 The second comment is that dividing 
responsibilities in such a manner is permissible, and indeed is the current 
practice of the UNSRESAE.85 In his most recent report Christof Heyns has 
divided consideration of obligations between abolitionist and retentionist 
states.86 Such divisions have been particularly useful in identifying that 
abolitionist states’ obligations do not end once the death penalty is eliminated 
from domestic practice. 
A The Death Penalty in International Law 
The death penalty is now in retreat globally.87 Although many states retain it 
as a form of criminal punishment, the list of states that actually practise capital 
                                                 
 83 Kate Lamb, ‘Bali Nine: Indonesia Has Death Penalty Double Standard, Says Brother of 
Spared Maid’, The Guardian (online), 16 February 2015 <https://perma.cc/K9NC-F2VX>. 
 84 Although the Special Rapporteur also takes this position, he has noted that obligations could 
potentially extend to de facto abolitionists: Report of the Special Rapporteur, UN Doc 
A/70/304, [98]. 
 85 Ibid.  
 86 Ibid [19]. Previously, rapporteurs have also been inclined to identify obligations, but this has 
largely been in relation to retentionist states: see Philip Alston, Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/7 
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 87 Saul Lehrfreund and Parvais Jabbar, ‘Constitutional Developments and the Restriction of 
the Death Penalty — Judicial Activism in the Commonwealth’ (2013) 5 European Human 
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punishment is shrinking.88 This progressive movement towards abolition is in 
line with the preservation of the right to life in the international human rights 
framework. This may seem perplexing as both the ICCPR and the European 
Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) give legal effect to the retention of the 
death penalty. Over time, however, this textual recognition has been eroded. 
Article 6(2) of the ICCPR states: 
In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be 
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at 
the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the 
present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final 
judgement rendered by a competent court.89 
This provision recognises from the outset that the obligation applies to those 
‘countries who have not abolished the death penalty’, thereby only allowing for 
the use of execution by those who had retained the punishment at the time of 
signature. It is also clearly an exception to the general right to life enshrined in 
art 6(1). Moreover the text also denotes that the death penalty can only be used 
for the ‘most serious crimes’, thereby pinning the legality of the execution on a 
subjective basis that can be, and has been, restricted over time. 
It has been noted that: 
At the time of adoption of the Covenant, States expected the category of 
permissible capital offences to narrow over the years, meaning that they could not 
enumerate those offences without limiting any future development.90 
The definition of ‘most serious crimes’ has now been reduced to only cover 
intentional killing through murder.91 Importantly for the context of the current 
discussion, the use of the death penalty for drug offences is not permissible under 
international law.92 As a large number of foreign nationals who face execution 
abroad are charged with drug offences, it is worthwhile making this connection 
to highlight that the execution of these individuals amounts to a breach of 
international law.93 
                                                 
 88 Human Rights Council, Question of the Death Penalty: Report of the Secretary-General, 
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Ultimately the requirement under international law, and the movement of 
states more generally, is towards a progressive abolition of the death penalty.94 
Abolitionist states indicate their recognition of this through signing and ratifying 
the Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (‘Second Optional Protocol’).95 This protocol not only pledges a 
total elimination of the death penalty domestically, but also includes a 
commitment to work towards its global abolition. In the preamble to the 
protocol, states affirm that they are ‘[d]esirous to undertake hereby an 
international commitment to abolish the death penalty’.96 Eric Neumayer has 
described this text in particular as an affirmation that the death penalty ‘cannot 
be regarded as an internal domestic affair’ and thus requires global action.97 
With currently 81 states parties, the Second Optional Protocol is the clearest 
commitment in treaty law that a state can make to the abolitionist agenda. 
The progressive abolition of the death penalty has been recognised to the 
greatest extent in the European human rights system. Similar to ICCPR art 6(2), 
art 2(1) of the ECHR initially recognised the legal practice of capital punishment: 
Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his 
life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.98 
In 1983, a sufficiently strong abolitionist movement was able to effectuate the 
drafting of Protocol 6 to the ECHR which moved Europe a step closer to total 
abolition. The preamble to this protocol notes that several member states had 
undergone an evolution that had formed ‘a general tendency in favour of 
abolition of the death penalty’.99 This protocol still retained the possibility of the 
use of the death penalty in times of war,100 and so the abolitionist movement in 
Europe continued to pursue total eradication. This goal was achieved in 2002 
with the drafting of Protocol 13 which abolishes the death penalty in all 
circumstances.101 Notably Protocol 13 does so by making reference to 
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Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, opened for signature 15 December 1989,  
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signature 3 May 2002, CETS No 187 (entered into force 1 July 2003) (‘Protocol 13’). 
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strengthening the right to life in art 2.102 It is here within the right to life where 
an emerging obligation of consular assistance will most naturally sit. 
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) has been 
equally progressive in terms of abolition. The Court has handed down a series of 
seminal cases that have restricted contracting parties’ involvement in the death 
penalty. Bharat Malkani compellingly uses these advancements in the case law to 
argue that abolitionist states are obligated to refrain from assisting the use of the 
death penalty in retentionist states.103 For instance, in Soering the Court found 
that the extradition of a German national from the United Kingdom to the United 
States, where he may face exposure to a lengthy period on death row, was 
sufficient to breach the prohibition on inhuman and degrading treatment.104 In 
Bader the Court found that extradition to a state where an individual may be 
executed after facing an unfair trial would give rise to breaches of arts 2 and 3.105 
In Öcalan the Court concluded that the death penalty, except in times of war, had 
become an unacceptable form of punishment within Europe.106 The 
progressively abolitionist jurisprudence of the ECtHR reached its apex in the 
case of Al-Saadoon.107 This application involved the transfer of two men held by 
British forces in Iraq to the newly formed governmental authorities after the 
2003 invasion. The men were alleged to have committed war crimes which 
brought with them the possibility of execution by hanging. With reference to the 
wide support for Protocols 6 and 13, and the state practice in observing the 
moratorium on the death penalty, the Court found that art 2 had been amended 
‘so as to prohibit the death penalty in all circumstances’.108 
B Establishing an Obligation 
It is contended here that the conditions created by the progressively 
abolitionist nature of the ICCPR and ECHR have laid the foundation for an 
emerging obligation to provide consular assistance to nationals of abolitionist 
states. While provisions in both treaties will be referred to here, there is a natural 
imbalance in favour of ECHR jurisprudence given the prolific nature of the 
ECtHR in addressing human rights issues. In an interpretive sense, the 
emergence of a right to consular assistance has come about as both the ICCPR 
and ECHR use the doctrine of the living instrument to construe treaty provisions 
in light of modern-day conditions. Al-Saadoon is a clear example of the living 
instrument in application in the European human rights system, going as far as to 
eliminate a textual provision from the ECHR. In interpreting the ICCPR the 
Human Rights Committee (‘HRC’) has been equally as willing to apply the 
doctrine of the living instrument to obligations concerning the death penalty. 
This is best illustrated in the 2003 decision of Judge v Canada where the HRC 
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recognised an obligation on abolitionist states of non-refoulement where it was 
reasonably anticipated that the individual would be sentenced to death, unless the 
state had sought assurances that the death sentence would not be used.109  
In doing so the Committee reversed its own previous opinion of 1993 in  
Kindler v Canada where it had found unqualified removals to a retentionist state 
permissible.110 The HRC revised its approach by stating that ‘the Covenant 
should be interpreted as a living instrument and the rights protected under it 
should be applied in context and in the light of present-day conditions’.111 The 
use of this teleological and progressive interpretative approach suggests that new 
obligations on abolitionist states can be recognised in light of modern 
circumstances. 
In order to consider how an obligation to provide consular assistance in death 
penalty cases has emerged in the right to life it is necessary to identify, and 
apply, the characteristics that are taken into account when courts use the doctrine 
of the living instrument. Identifying these indicators, however, is not an easy task 
as, to borrow the words of Sir Nicholas Bratza, the former President of the 
ECtHR, the application of the living instrument is not an ‘exact science’.112 
Nonetheless from analysis of the case law and leading academic literature on the 
living instrument it is possible to categorise three key indicators that courts use 
when ascertaining whether the doctrine should be applied to interpret provisions. 
The first of these is that any change that the Court makes must be 
‘incremental and evolutionary rather than revolutionary’.113 This implies that, 
perhaps in order to allay the fears of the more conservative participants in the 
system of protection, any enhancement must be marginal rather than crucial. 
Baroness Hale at the UK Supreme Court subscribes to this approach, stating that 
any change must be ‘predictable’.114 The development of a human right to 
consular assistance — particularly for states which have already abolished the 
death penalty — certainly would be a marginal evolution and in line with the 
progressively abolitionist nature of international human rights law. Moreover, 
given growing acceptance of a human right to consular access within the right to 
life, the emergence of any such right would be equally predictable. 
The second characteristic is that rights must be interpreted ‘in the light of 
present day conditions’.115 In both Öcalan and Al-Saadoon the ECtHR relied 
heavily upon a general opposition to the death penalty within Europe. Amongst 
other indicators, the Court illustrated this by pointing to the number of 
signatories to Protocol 13. Equally relevant in an international context would be 
the number of states which have signed the Second Optional Protocol.  
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The picture which this presents at both a regional and global level is a general 
strengthening of the abolitionist movement. At a more basic level, human rights 
standards across the globe lean towards a higher standard of protection.116 This 
dual recognition makes the argument for a human right to consular assistance 
more compelling. 
Thirdly, the Court looks to ‘developments and commonly accepted 
standards’.117 This has been interpreted by the ECtHR to mean a common 
European standard,118 or intention.119 In recent times, however, the Court has 
also looked to developments and common standards internationally, thus 
bringing in law and practice from domestic and international bodies.120 The 
argument for a right to consular assistance sits naturally here as state practice 
already illustrates that, on the whole, when notified, states will take positive 
steps to assist nationals facing execution abroad. Indeed, when discussing 
whether states should provide diplomatic protection to nationals facing the death 
penalty Malkani has appropriately remarked that ‘it is difficult to think of a 
“good” reason for not offering protection’.121 The culmination of this analysis is 
that there is a strong case to be made for the recognition of a right to consular 
assistance within the wider right to life in the ICCPR and ECHR, when read 
concurrently with the relevant abolitionist protocols (Second Optional Protocol, 
ECHR Protocols 6 and 13). 
C The Substance of a Right to Consular Assistance 
In practice, any such right would take the form of a positive obligation on 
states to protect the right to life through the provision of consular assistance. The 
ECtHR has interpreted the positive obligation to protect life broadly,122 so as to 
apply ‘in the context of any activity, whether public or not, in which the right to 
life may be at stake’.123 Although the positive obligation to protect life would be 
applicable to any case involving the death penalty, the argument would be 
particularly strong in relation to the obligation to prevent ‘unlawful killing’. 
While the ECtHR has understood this previously as an obligation to prevent 
                                                 
 116 In Demir v Turkey the Court noted that it was necessary ‘to reflect the increasingly high 
standard being required in the area of the protection of human rights, thus necessitating 
greater firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies’: 
Demir v Turkey [2008] V Eur Court HR 395, 439 [146]. The same sentiment was reiterated 
by the UNHCR in Saadi: ‘rights were given a broad construction and … limitations were 
narrowly construed, in a manner which gave practical and effective protection to human 
rights, and as a living instrument, in the light of present day conditions and in accordance 
with developments in international law so as to reflect the increasingly high standard being 
required in the area of the protection of human rights’. Saadi v United Kingdom [2008] I Eur 
Court HR 31, 57 [55]. 
 117 Tyrer (1978) 26 Eur Court HR (ser A) 15–16 [31]. 
 118 George Letsas, ‘The ECHR as a Living Instrument: Its Meaning and Legitimacy’ in Andreas 
Føllesdal, Birgit Peters and Geir Ulfstein (eds), Constituting Europe: The European Court 
of Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context (Cambridge University Press, 
2013) 106, 109. 
 119 Hale, above n 114. 
 120 Alastair Mowbray, ‘An Examination of the European Court of Human Rights’ Approach to 
Overruling Its Previous Case Law’ (2009) 9 Human Rights Law Review 179, 194–7.  
 121 Malkani, above n 27, 541. 
 122 LCB v United Kingdom [1998] III Eur Court HR 1390, 1403 [36]. 
 123 Öneryildiz v Turkey [2004] XII Eur Court HR 79, 110 [71]. 
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unlawful killing by private individuals, an argument could certainly be made that 
the execution of nationals for crimes which do not meet the ‘most serious’ 
threshold, for instance drug smuggling and blasphemy, would also require a 
positive obligation on states to provide effective consular assistance in order to 
avoid a breach of international law. 
Given the broad range of functions which a consular agent can take to assist a 
national facing execution abroad, it would be difficult to construct an exhaustive 
list of actions which are entailed in a right to consular assistance. As the 
provision of consular assistance will involve the expenditure of capital, it is also 
necessary to establish a level of protection which can be achieved by all states. 
After all, a large number of developing nations are abolitionist124 and it would be 
unrealistic to expect that these states could offer the same external assistance to 
nationals abroad as their developed counterparts. A limited interpretation of the 
substance of any such right would require, at the very least, consular agents to 
provide advice and assistance to nationals when requested, and if necessary, 
assist them in locating adequate legal representation and interpreters. Beyond 
this, compelling arguments can also be made for the provision of funding for 
legal representation, the filing of amicus curiae briefs and assistance in obtaining 
mitigating evidence. A difficult balancing act is required to be drawn between 
assistance and services that can readily be provided by the state, and those that, 
for policy or legal reasons, are beyond the scope of reasonable assistance. This 
limitation of expectations has been recognised by the ECtHR which has caveated 
the scope of positive obligations so that they ‘must be interpreted in a way which 
does not impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities’.125 
This qualification will be perfectly appropriate in situations involving consular 
officials and nationals detained overseas. 
In issuing guiding principles on the positive obligation in the right to life the 
ECtHR has noted that the requirement on states is to ‘take appropriate steps to 
safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction’.126 Having constructed an 
argument in this Part in favour of an emerging right to consular assistance for 
nationals of abolitionist states, Part V will review how this jurisdictional 
prerequisite is the principal obstacle to the enforcement of any such right. 
V EXTRATERRITORIAL OBLIGATIONS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF A RIGHT TO 
CONSULAR ASSISTANCE 
By its very definition consular assistance is provided to nationals outside of 
the territory of their home state. Framing a human right to receive consular 
assistance in death penalty cases therefore requires recognition that human rights 
obligations follow consular agents extraterritorially. Herein lies the principal 
difficulty in enforcing a right to consular assistance. This Part demonstrates that 
difficulty and proposes a solution for its remedy. 
                                                 
 124 For a useful map on retentionist and abolitionist nations, see Death Penalty Information 
Center, Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries (31 December 2015) 
<https://perma.cc/XL7Q-4XZ2>. 
 125 Kontrova v Slovakia (European Court of Human Rights, Fourth Section, Application No 
7510/04, 31 May 2007) [49]. 
 126 Ibid [49] (emphasis added). 
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A The Extraterritorial Application of the ICCPR and ECHR 
The geographic scope of both the ICCPR and ECHR is defined by application 
clauses within the respective treaties. States parties’ obligations in the ICCPR are 
limited through art 2 to ‘all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction’.127 The HRC has interpreted that these obligations apply to all 
branches of state agents and governmental authorities, meaning that there is no 
specific bar to consular agents in holding an obligation to provide assistance.128 
As obligations under the ICCPR only extend to individuals within a state’s 
‘territory and subject to its jurisdiction’, the extent to which a consular agent’s 
responsibilities are engaged is limited.129 The HRC has interpreted this provision 
to mean that 
a State party must respect and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant to 
anyone within the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not 
situated within the territory of the State Party.130 
The parallel geographic application of the ECHR is defined by art 1 of the 
treaty which reads: 
The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the 
rights and freedoms defined in Section I of this Convention.131 
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR has highlighted the importance of the 
exercise of ‘jurisdiction’ in the context it is expressed in art 1 of the ECHR: 
The exercise of jurisdiction is a necessary condition for a Contracting State to be 
able to be held responsible for acts or omissions imputable to it which give rise to 
an allegation of the infringement of rights and freedoms set forth in the 
Convention.132 
This clarification is appropriate for the scope of both treaties. For a state to 
owe an obligation to an individual, and for an individual to be able to enforce 
that obligation, or seek redress for a violation, they must first establish that they 
were either within the ‘territory and subject to its jurisdiction’ (ICCPR), or 
within the ‘jurisdiction’ (ECHR) of the state at the relevant time of injury. The 
prerequisite exercise of jurisdiction has been interpreted to arise extraterritorially 
                                                 
 127 ICCPR art 2(1): ‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status’. Gondek notes that the use of the word ‘territory’ was at the insistence of the 
US: Michał Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalizing World: Extraterritorial 
Application of Human Rights Treaties (Intersentia, 2009) 76. King considers the 
extraterritorial application of the ICCPR in Hugh King, ‘The Extraterritorial Human Rights 
Obligations of States’ (2009) 9 Human Rights Law Review 521, 522–30. 
 128 ‘All branches of government (executive, legislative and judicial), and other public  
or governmental authorities, at whatever level — national, regional or local — are in a 
position to engage the responsibility of the State Party’: Human Rights Committee,  
General Comment No 31: The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States 
Parties to the Covenant, 80th sess, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (26 May 2004) [4] 
(‘General Comment No 31’). 
 129 ICCPR art 2(1). 
 130 General Comment No 31, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, [10]. 
 131 ECHR art 1. 
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in two manners: through the control of territory, known as spatial jurisdiction, 
and through the exercise of authority and control over people, known as personal 
jurisdiction.133 Consular agents will most commonly exercise jurisdiction over 
nationals abroad following personal principles. 
B Extraterritorial Obligations and Consular Agents 
As the leading global treaties protecting the civil and political rights of 
individuals, the ICCPR and ECHR have a long history of informing one another 
on principles, meanings and interpretations.134 For the purposes of this 
evaluation on the extraterritorial right to consular assistance it is the 
jurisprudence of the ECHR which will receive primary consideration. Two 
reasons are given for this. First, as all 47 contracting parties to the ECHR have 
abolished the death penalty, there is merit in using its system of enforcement as 
an illustration of the difficulties in extraterritorially applying a right to consular 
assistance in death penalty cases. It is particularly useful as the right to consular 
assistance is most likely to apply to these states as abolitionists. The second 
reason is the seminal importance that the interpretation of ECHR art 1 has had in 
the understanding of the extraterritorial application of human rights more 
generally. The significance of art 1 case law has led Marko Milanović to state 
that the ECHR ‘contains the prototype jurisdiction clause’.135 Similarly Olivier 
De Schutter observes that the Strasbourg Court is ‘a laboratory for the 
understanding of the evolving notion of “jurisdiction” in the era of 
globalization’.136 Barbara Miltner concurs, stating that the ECtHR’s 
interpretation is so important that it contributes ‘to the sense that any judgment 
on the issue would be closely watched’.137 
A positive starting point for enforcing a right to consular assistance is that the 
ECtHR has long recognised that treaty obligations can extend extraterritorially to 
diplomatic and consular agents. The first case concerning the extraterritorial 
application of the ECHR, X v Federal Republic of Germany, is illustrative of 
this.138 Involving both accusations of espionage and a challenge to a duel, the 
facts of this early 1960s case have been appropriately described as ‘bizarre in the 
extreme’.139 The applicant alleged that as a result of personal disagreements with 
                                                 
 133 Wilde has utilised the ‘personal’ and ‘spatial’ distinctions in his work on art 1: Ralph Wilde, 
‘Legal “Black Hole”? Extraterritorial State Action and International Treaty Law on Civil 
and Political Rights’ (2005) 26 Michigan Journal of International Law 739, 741. 
 134 The drafting of both treaties commenced contemporaneously. Indeed Gondek has described 
the respect ECHR drafters awarded to the drafting at the UN as ‘striking’: Gondek,  
above n 127, 84. The ECtHR has borrowed from the HRC interpretations of jurisdiction: 
see, eg, Issa where the Court used statements made in the HRC opinion of Lopez Burgos v 
Uruguay. Issa v Turkey (European Court of Human Rights, Second Section, Application No 
31821/96, 16 November 2004) [71] 
 135 Marko Milanović, ‘From Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the Concept of State 
Jurisdiction in Human Rights Treaties’ (2008) 8 Human Rights Law Review 411, 413. 
 136 Olivier De Schutter, ‘Globalization and Jurisdiction: Lessons from the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ (Working Paper No 9, Center for Human Rights and Global 
Justice, 2005) 7. 
 137 Barbara Miltner, ‘Revisiting Extraterritoriality after Al-Skeini: The ECHR and Its Lessons’ 
(2012) 33 Michigan Journal of International Law 693, 694. 
 138 X v Federal Republic of Germany (1965) 8 Eur Comm HR 158. 
 139 R (B) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs [2005] QB 643, 657 
(Lord Phillips).  
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the German consul in Morocco he had inter alia lost his title of nobility, been 
deported, suffered a loss of property and his wife had lost her employment.140 
Although the application was ultimately dismissed on the grounds of being 
manifestly ill-founded, the now defunct European Commission on Human Rights 
(‘ECommHR’) still considered whether the applicant would otherwise have 
fallen within German jurisdiction. It noted that: 
Whereas, in certain respects, the nationals of a Contracting State are within its 
‘jurisdiction’ even when domiciled or resident abroad; whereas, in particular, the 
diplomatic and consular representatives of their country of origin perform certain 
duties with regard to them which may, in certain circumstances, make that 
country liable in respect of the Convention.141 
This ‘nationality’ basis for jurisdiction echoes that found in public 
international law.142 As a doctrine, it would suggest that art 1 jurisdiction, and 
thus human rights obligations, could potentially travel extraterritorially to any 
national of a contracting party anywhere in the world. Although attractive, any 
such interpretation would prove impractical to enforce as it would simply be 
impossible for a state to protect the rights of its citizens at all times, and 
anywhere they were located. There is also the risk that such an interpretation 
could suggest that nationals of a sending state would be rights holders, while 
non-nationals would not. Milanović has described such an approach to 
extraterritorial rights protection as a ‘fallacy’.143 It would also be incompatible 
with the universal principles upon which both the ECHR and ICCPR are founded 
to singularly define the extraterritorial application of human rights obligations on 
a basis of nationality.144 
This interpretation would also give rise to particular problems in the practice 
of consular affairs. This is because many states have signed multilateral and 
bilateral agreements whereby they share consular responsibilities with one 
another. For instance, if a member state of the European Union does not have a 
consular outpost in the country where an EU citizen is located, that citizen has a 
right to seek assistance from any other EU member which has consular 
                                                 
 140 X v Federal Republic of Germany (1965) 8 Eur Comm HR 158, 160, 162. 
 141 Ibid 168 (emphasis in original). 
 142 Wallace defines it writing that ‘[a] state may exercise jurisdiction over any of its nationals 
wherever they may be and in respect of offences committed abroad’: Rebecca M M 
Wallace, International Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 3rd ed, 1997) 114. Lowe and Staker remark 
that ‘[s]tates have an undisputed right to extend the application of their laws to their citizens 
(that is, those who have the nationality of the State), wherever they may be’: Vaughan Lowe 
and Christopher Staker, ‘Jurisdiction’ in Malcolm D Evans (ed), International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 3rd ed, 2010) 323. Triggs adds that ‘[a] state has competence to prosecute 
and punish its nationals solely on the basis of their nationality’: Gillian D Triggs, 
International Law: Contemporary Principles and Practices (LexisNexis Butterworths, 
2006) 351. 
 143 Marko Milanović, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles, 
and Policy (Oxford University Press, 2011) 81. 
 144 ECHR Preamble: ‘Considering the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10th December 1948; Considering that this 
Declaration aims at securing the universal and effective recognition and observance of the 
Rights therein declared’. ICCPR Preamble: ‘Recognizing that, in accordance with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and 
political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are 
created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, 
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authorities in that state.145 UK authorities also provide consular assistance to 
nationals of Commonwealth states in countries where their home state does not 
have a consular outpost,146 while other close allies have similar sharing 
arrangements.147 In light of this, it is worth noting that the emerging human right 
on states to provide consular assistance cannot be framed only for their nationals, 
but to the nationals of any state who they have the authority to provide consular 
assistance to. Naturally this may give rise to an exceptional situation where a 
citizen of a retentionist state is owed a human right to consular assistance from 
an abolitionist state.148 If such a scenario were to arise, the obligation to provide 
consular assistance could still apply given that its source is derived from the 
abolitionist state’s legal commitments and not from the identity of the rights 
holder. 
The question of obligations on consular agents was addressed again by the 
ECtHR in the 1970s case of X v United Kingdom.149 This application concerned 
a complaint by a British mother, whose child had been taken to Jordan by her 
Jordanian father. The applicant requested that the British consul in Amman 
obtain custody of her daughter. The consulate took what actions were open to it 
including reporting on the child’s wellbeing, providing a list of lawyers 
practising in Jordan and registering the daughter on her mother’s passport. The 
applicant saw these actions as unsatisfactory and alleged a violation of the right 
to family life.150 Similar to the earlier X v Federal Republic of Germany case, 
this application was being brought directly against the home state for alleged 
breaches of obligations owed by that state to their nationals. The Commission 
found this application to be manifestly ill-founded and yet still recognised the 
potential for the personal extension of jurisdiction by a consular agent.151 It did  
 
 
 
                                                 
 145 Council Directive 2015/637 of 20 April 2015 on the Coordination and Cooperation 
Measures to Facilitate Consular Protection for Unrepresented Citizens of the Union in 
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 148 Malaysia currently retains the death penalty while the United Kingdom has abolished its 
practice de jure and de facto. If a Malaysian national was facing criminal charges in a state 
where Malaysia lacked a consular outpost, the national may receive consular assistance from 
the United Kingdom. That being said, it would be more likely for Malaysian consular 
officials to travel to the national from the nearest outpost in a different state. 
 149 X v United Kingdom (1977) 12 Eur Comm HR 73. 
 150 ECHR art 8. 
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so by following other contemporary interpretations of art 1 jurisdiction where it 
had been stated that:152 
The acts of State officials, including diplomatic or consular agents, bring persons 
and property under the jurisdiction of that State, to the extent that they exercise 
their authority in respect of these persons or that property.153 
The operative wording for extraterritorial obligations therefore changed from 
‘jurisdiction’ to ‘authority’. The Commission went on to clarify when an 
individual would fall within the exercise of a consular agent’s authority, stating 
that ‘[i]nsofar as they affect such persons or property by their acts or omissions, 
the responsibility of the State is engaged’.154 
This broad understanding was followed by the Commission over a decade 
later in the next, and final, case to directly consider obligations on diplomatic 
and consular agents, V v Denmark.155 Intent on leaving East Germany, a group of 
individuals including the applicant entered the premises of the Danish embassy 
in East Berlin and requested negotiations with East German authorities 
concerning permits to leave the country.156 At the request of the Danish 
ambassador, East German police entered the embassy and removed them from 
the building. They were held in custody for a number of days and some, 
including the applicant, were subsequently sentenced to conditional 
imprisonment for their actions. When released the applicant alleged that the 
actions of the Danish ambassador in calling the East German police had violated 
his rights under the ECHR. Thus, unlike the two former cases this application 
involved an allegation that a consular agent of another state had violated the 
applicant’s rights. Nonetheless, it still bears significance as it establishes how 
consular officials owe human rights obligations. Again the ECommHR found the 
exercise of jurisdiction but did not recognise a violation of the ECHR. The 
Commission instead noted that the applicant’s detention had come at the hands 
of East German authorities and could not be wholly attributed to the Danish 
ambassador.157 Most notable perhaps is that in this case the Commission had the 
opportunity to make a finding of jurisdiction based on the de facto spatial control 
a state exercises over its embassy and consulate offices and yet instead selected 
to follow the broader personal jurisdiction which had been applied in X v United 
Kingdom.158 
On the understanding of this early jurisprudence there would be little 
difficulty in establishing a human right to consular assistance for nationals of an 
abolitionist state. By specifically following the approach in X v United Kingdom 
it could be asserted that a consular agent exercised ‘authority’ over a national 
detained on capital charges abroad. That authority would arise either through the 
act of the consular agent in providing assistance, or their omission in failing to 
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do so, which directly affected the national’s right to life by increasing the 
prospects of them facing execution. 
Two further cases heard by the ECtHR have touched on the understanding of 
jurisdiction exercised by consular agents and influenced the scope of how a 
consular agent establishes a jurisdictional link. The first of these is the seminal 
Banković judgment which concerned the death of several civilians in a NATO 
bombing raid on a radio–television station in Belgrade during the Balkan 
conflict.159 The significance of this judgment was that it was the first major 
interpretation of the ECHR’s extraterritoriality by the newly established Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR.160 In a unanimous decision, the ECtHR ruled 
jurisdiction to be ‘primarily territorial’161 subject to a series of interpretations 
that included ‘the activities of its diplomatic or consular agents abroad’.162 There 
is merit in the fact that while other bases of jurisdiction fell by the wayside due 
to the Court’s narrow territorial interpretation in Banković, the recognition that 
diplomatic and consular agents could still owe obligations remained strong. Also 
notable here is that the Court in Banković failed to link the understanding of 
jurisdiction with the ‘authority’ test which had been applied in the earlier cases, 
instead positioning it in a wider understanding of extraterritorial actions which 
are accepted in customary international law.163 
The second case is that of Al-Skeini.164 Similar to Banković, this case was 
both a seminal judgment of a unanimous Grand Chamber and it did not involve 
consular agents directly. The application has been widely lauded as adjusting 
some of the more restrictive interpretations in the Banković decision.165 In it the 
ECtHR found that UK forces had exercised jurisdiction over six individuals who 
died during security operations in south-east Iraq in the course of their 
occupation of that region. The case came at the end of a decade of stifling 
indecision and confusion in the ECtHR on the understanding of art 1 jurisdiction. 
In providing its decision the Court sought to clarify the extraterritorial 
application of the ECHR through elucidating the ‘[g]eneral principles relevant to 
jurisdiction under Article 1 of the Convention’.166 In doing so it again recognised 
that diplomatic and consular agents could hold extraterritorial obligations, this 
time indicating a specific test for these agents. It held: 
it is clear that the acts of diplomatic and consular agents, who are present on 
foreign territory in accordance with provisions of international law, may amount 
                                                 
 159 Banković v Belgium [2001] XII Eur Court HR 333, 340 [6]–[11] (‘Banković’). 
 160 Grand Chamber cases are always heard before 17 judges, including the national judge of the 
state accused of the human rights violation. See European Court of Human Rights, 
Frequently Asked Questions: The Grand Chamber <https://perma.cc/Q4AM-5Q43>. 
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to an exercise of jurisdiction when these agents exert authority and control over 
others …167 
This reading of jurisdiction exercised by diplomatic and consular agents 
simply shatters the relative consistency and coherence provided in earlier cases. 
Not only did the Court depart from the sole use of ‘authority’ as the basis for the 
jurisdictional connection, but in doing so it also introduced a prerequisite of 
‘control’ into the understanding. Through use of the word ‘and’ instead of ‘or’ at 
the end of this final sentence the Court indicated that, not only does an individual 
have to be within the authority of consular agents, something which is 
intelligible following X v United Kingdom, but that they must also be within their 
control. The obvious problem here is that consular agents have no authority to 
exercise control of individuals while in a foreign state. 
The ECtHR may have included control in the test for jurisdiction as a 
response to the nature of the extraterritorial cases arriving at the ECtHR. In the 
period between Banković and Al-Skeini the Court had considered a range of cases 
involving the use of force by military agents. The rise of cases involving 
shootings,168 detention on the high seas169 and in foreign states,170 aerial 
bombings171 and allegations of torture,172 had altered the narrative surrounding 
art 1 in that the ECtHR was no longer concerned with a mix of both military and 
non-military cases, but almost entirely focused on the actions of the armed forces 
of European states abroad. This could possibly explain how the notion of 
‘control’, a characteristic which fits far more naturally in considerations of 
military actions, managed to slip into the art 1 test for consular agents. 
Ultimately, however, it may be even more likely that the presence of ‘control’ 
in the Court’s statement of principles on diplomatic and consular agents was 
simply made without consideration of its implications. As consular agents have 
no power or authority to exercise control over individuals they come into contact 
with it is difficult to identify a reason why ‘control’ was included. At the drafting 
of the VCCR it was noted that some consular officials had been found to molest 
political refugees from their home state.173 Even if one expands an understanding 
of ‘control’ to its widest possible meaning, it is not entirely clear how an action 
like this would give rise to a jurisdictional link. Control equally would not have 
assisted any of the applicants in the earlier ECommHR jurisprudence.174 
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Moreover, later in the statement of principles in Al-Skeini the Court notes that 
state agents can exercise personal jurisdiction through the use of force. It stated: 
‘the use of force by a State’s agents operating outside its territory may bring the 
individual thereby brought under the control of the State’s authorities into the 
State’s art 1 jurisdiction’.175 If the Court intended that consular agents would 
create a jurisdictional link when it exercised physical control over individuals, 
then it would have been sufficient to abstract that from this guiding principle, 
and not include it in a section that appears to be reserved for the actions of 
diplomatic and consular authorities. It is possible that the Court intended for two 
different meanings of control: one for diplomatic and consular agents and one for 
military agents. However if that is the case then the Court has embedded 
inconsistency at a point in time when attempting to articulate clarity on the 
‘general principles’ of jurisdiction in art 1. 
Whether included by error or intent, the presence of control has radically 
limited the situations in which a consular agent will owe human rights 
obligations. This is exemplified best with reference to the UK Supreme Court’s 
application of the jurisdiction test from Al-Skeini in the case of Sandiford.176 
This case concerned a UK national who was convicted of drug trafficking 
offences in Bali in 2012. Mrs Sandiford, who suffers from both physical and 
mental health conditions, admitted the offences at trial and cooperated with 
Indonesian police leading to the arrest of four others. She contended throughout 
proceedings that she was carrying 10 packets of cocaine when arrested at Bali’s 
airport because a member of a drug syndicate had threatened to kill her son if she 
did not. At trial the prosecutor sought a punishment of 15 years’ imprisonment; 
however, pursuant to Indonesia’s notoriously strict approach to foreign drug 
smugglers, the court handed down a sentence of death by firing squad. Sandiford 
appealed against the death sentence and concurrently brought litigation in UK 
courts seeking an order for the government to locate and pay for suitable legal 
representation for her appeal proceedings.177 Her claim was therefore based on 
the right to a fair trial and not the right to life.178 For this right to be operative 
extraterritorially Mrs Sandiford had to first establish that she was within UK 
jurisdiction for the purposes of art 1. Faced with the competing jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR and ECommHR, the Supreme Court unsurprisingly followed the 
most recent understanding in Al-Skeini that had been deemed to be the most 
authoritative exposition of the extraterritorial application of the ECHR by the 
ECtHR,179 the UK Supreme Court180 and the Master of the Rolls in the Court of 
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Appeal.181 Analysing the jurisdictional link, the Court held that the applicant had 
‘been apprehended, convicted and tried for drug smuggling in Indonesia. If one 
asks, by reference to any common-sense formulation, under whose authority or 
control she is, the answer is: that of the Indonesian authorities’.182 Clearly the 
Court was influenced by the fact that it was Indonesian, and not British 
authorities, who had exercised direct ‘control’ over her. 
The implications of this redefined interpretation of jurisdiction from Al-Skeini 
are crippling on any emerging human right to consular assistance. Although the 
incipient right may exist within the substantive right to life, in effect, it will not 
give rise to a legal obligation practically enforceable against states until such 
times as a clearer extraterritorial connection is established. Within the ICCPR 
system, the use of ‘anyone within the power or effective control’ as an 
interpretation for the extraterritorial extension of obligations is only marginally 
better, the notion of ‘power’ being perhaps more flexible than that of ‘control’, 
and use of ‘or’ instead of ‘and’ suggesting the possibility of a disjunctive reading 
of this test. Nonetheless, the present interpretation in both treaties could leave 
any human right to consular assistance practically unenforceable. 
C Realigning Extraterritorial Obligations on Consular Authorities 
The issue of the extraterritorial application of human rights more generally is 
as contentious as it is complex. Both courts and legal commentators alike have 
struggled between normative and practical considerations in attempting to 
ascertain a coherent understanding of when a state is subject to human rights 
obligations while abroad. Most recently, the extension of extraterritorial human 
rights obligations into military affairs has resulted in a backlash against judicial 
opinions.183 In an area filled with complex influences, it would be far too 
simplistic to reduce the debate to two positions and yet the major conceptual 
conflict is between states which fear extraterritorial obligations will open the 
floodgates to impractical obligations and infinite litigation, and individuals who 
see the extraterritorial protection of human rights as being a state’s natural, moral 
responsibility. This conflict is perhaps even more contentious when positive 
human rights obligations are at issue. Yet, in the narrowly defined area of human 
rights obligations to those facing the death penalty abroad, it is contended that 
there is a jurisdictional interpretation available which could bridge the gap 
between substance and practice. 
The starting point for this contention is that the Grand Chamber in Al-Skeini 
was correct to identify a bespoke test for extraterritorial jurisdiction to be applied 
to diplomatic and consular agents. Attempting to apply a universal test for all 
state agents ranging from the drone operative to the consular official does not 
reflect the realities of modern-day international relations, or interaction between 
the state and individuals. Judge Giovanni Bonello of the ECtHR has noted his 
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frustration at the practice of attempting to apply notions of jurisdiction between 
wholly varying situations stating: 
In my view, this relentless search for eminently tangential case-law is as fruitful 
and fulfilling as trying to solve one crossword puzzle with the clues of another.184 
In light of this, the proposal made here is for the understanding of the 
extraterritorial extension of jurisdiction by consular agents to return to the 
previous test that had functioned adequately. Thus, instead of taking an entirely 
new approach to jurisdiction, the ECtHR, or indeed the HRC, would be better 
placed to simply return to the test used in X v United Kingdom where jurisdiction 
could arise when a state ‘affect[s] such persons or property by their acts or 
omissions’.185 In an interpretative sense, this understanding of jurisdiction would 
sit as naturally within the ICCPR recourse to ‘power’ as it does within the ECHR 
use of ‘authority’. 
The concern for states with this approach would be that such a broad 
interpretation would burden consular authorities with a wide range of human 
rights obligations that could only be discharged through an increase in 
expenditure.186 As the argument would go, if ‘affect’ was the operative word 
then obligations would not only extend to the provision of consular assistance in 
death penalty cases, but may also include issues of repatriation, forced marriage, 
child abduction and property rights. In the Sandiford case this ‘floodgates’ 
argument was evidently a concern for the UK Supreme Court who stated if 
jurisdiction were found: 
Logically, article 6 would be engaged in respect of every criminal charge, 
however serious or minor, brought against a British citizen in any overseas 
country in the world. Article 6 would become a compulsory world-wide legal aid 
scheme for impecunious British citizens abroad, presumably even for those who 
had decided to live permanently abroad.187 
This concern is combined with the contemporary challenge which consular 
services face in managing the expectations of what their agents can provide to 
citizens. The growth in media technology has brought about a greater 
understanding of what services consular officials can offer. Okano-Heijmans also 
notes that ‘[c]itizens are becoming increasingly assertive, the media more 
engaged and news reporting more international’.188  
Although certainly having merit, these concerns may be overstated given the 
particular nuances surrounding the extraterritorial application of human rights. 
The ECHR system of extraterritorial rights protection in particular has evolved to 
frame a different level of obligations between spatial and personal jurisdiction. 
The exercise of spatial jurisdiction requires complete adherence to the ECHR and 
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all of its rights.189 Personal jurisdiction, on the other hand, allows for a division 
whereby  
the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that individual the 
rights and freedoms under Section I of the Convention that are relevant to the 
situation of that individual. In this sense, therefore, the Convention rights can be 
‘divided and tailored’.190  
By delimiting the application of obligations to those ‘relevant to the situation’ 
consular agents may not be overburdened by positive human rights obligations 
which they simply cannot fulfil without incurring heavy expenses. As Miltner 
notes, the Court can now ‘cherry-pick’ which rights are applicable to the given 
situation.191 Rights can also be tailored internally so that some obligations 
contained within them are not applicable extraterritorially. The concern remains 
that developing states may find any increased requirement to provide consular 
assistance to be an unreasonable financial burden. Perhaps as a departure point 
for any future interpretation of the right to consular assistance, courts and 
monitoring bodies could therefore focus on the perceived harm caused to an 
individual if a right was not provided. This would then suggest that an 
extraterritorial human right to consular assistance in death penalty cases would 
be recognised, whereas more trivial complaints would not. 
The concern for states would then turn to what level of help would fulfil a 
right to consular assistance in death penalty cases. Would normal assistance at a 
police station or in a prison meet that threshold? Or would it need to be more 
invested and include, for instance, funding for legal representation, the 
submission of amicus curiae briefs and help in obtaining mitigating 
statements?192 These are ultimately questions of the substantive application of 
the right to consular assistance and, of course, obligations of this nature can be 
discharged by a state if accused of a violation. It should be remembered that 
although jurisdiction was found in X v Federal Republic of Germany, X v United 
Kingdom and V v Denmark, the ECommHR continued in these cases to find that 
the relevant states’ obligations under the ECHR had not been breached. With a 
framework in place for the balancing of the competing interests of states and the 
individual, the emergence of a human right to consular assistance in death 
penalty cases should not be seen as containing an impractical ideal. 
VI CONCLUSION 
The provision of consular assistance for nationals facing execution abroad can 
prove to be the difference between life and death; between a long custodial 
sentence and the firing squad; between freedom and a potential miscarriage of 
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justice. For many abolitionist states the emergence of a right to consular 
assistance will require no change in policy or procedure given that they already 
take major steps to assist nationals facing the death penalty abroad.193 The 
emergence of this right may therefore only act to serve as an oversight for states, 
meaning that its real value is in consideration of whether it is being complied 
with and what nature of assistance is given. For the right to be meaningful, 
however, it requires a framework of enforceability that is currently absent. Given 
the contemporary understanding of extraterritorial human rights obligation, both 
within the ECHR and ICCPR systems of protection, there is little scope to attach 
obligations to consular officials with regard to nationals facing execution in a 
foreign state. A reaffirmation of previous understandings of extraterritorial 
obligations is needed for this right to be realised. 
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